The agreement between Russia and Great Britain in 1907 was inevitable?

The structure of International relations as the primary level of analysis dominates neo-realist theory. In neo-realism the international systems structure is decentralised and anarchic, the states are rational unitary actors in which they act individualistically, selfishly to keep as many options open as possible.[[Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International politics, New York, 1979, pp.88, 91.]] If realism or neo-realism is the correct then the state will respond rationally to changes in the balance of power by balancing the rising power.

The balance of power can be simply defined in modern terms as: a doctrine and an arrangement whereby the power of one state (or group of states) is checked by the countervailing power of other states.[[Robert H. Jackson, ‘The evolution of International Society’, in John Baylis & Steve Smith eds. The Globalisation of World Politics: An introduction to international relations, Second Edition, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2001, pp35-50, p.36.]] However there is no single definition that is agreed upon today.[[Michael Sheehan, The Balance of Power: History and Theory, Routledge, London, 1996, pp.1-4.]] There was an even broader use of the term in the nineteenth century, balance could mean equilibrium and exist within a hegemonic system.[[Paul W. Schroeder, ‘Did the Vienna Settlement Rest on a Balance of Power?’, The American Historical Review, Vol.97, No.3, (Jun., 1992), pp.683-706, p.695.]] The Foreign Office definition of the time was:

Eyre Crowe

“The only check on the abuse of political predominance derived from such a position has always consisted in the opposition of and equally formidable rival, or of a combination of several countries forming leagues of defence. The equilibrium established by such a grouping of forces is technically known as the balance of power.”[[Memorandum by Mr. Eyre Crowe, January 1 1907, G.P. Gooch & Harold Temperley eds., British Documents on the Origins of the War 1898-1914, Vol. III The Testing of the entente 1904-6, London, 1928, p.403.]]

In looking at the balance of power international relations scholars tend to look at economics and defence spending.[[for figures see: Paul Kennedy, ‘The First World War and the International Power System’, International Security, Vol. 9, No. 1, (Summer, 1984), pp.7-40, A.J.P. Taylor, The Struggle for Mastery in Europe, 1848-1918, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1971. pp.xix-xxxvi., ‘National Material Capabilities’ (v3.02), Correlates of War project, accessed 26/11/06 (website said to reference article) – Singer J. David, ‘Reconstructing the Correlates of War Dataset on Material Capabilities of States, 1816-1985’, International Interactions, Vol 14, (1987), pp.115-132.]] Paul Kennedy for example argues the triumph of a state is a product “of the way in which that state’s economy had been rising or falling, relative to the other leading nations, in the decades preceding the actual conflict.”[[Kennedy, Rise and Fall, p.xv.]]

In terms of economics Germany was becoming the top European nation its Iron and Steel production in 1907 was 11.6 million tons compared to 12 million tons for Russia, Britain and France combined.[[Correlates of War]] Her immense economy allowed Germany to spend very large amounts on the military without straining the economy. She had an immense lead in newer industries for example chemicals and electricals. Economiclly Britain was in decline although still ahead in older industries such as coal production and shipping[[Kennedy, World War, pp.18, 21.]] and even if not on top industrially Britain was still the greatest financial Power. However if one looks at industrial growth Russia was doing best growing at a rate of 5% per year from 1860-1913, and she was the worlds second largest oil producer.[[Kennedy, Rise and Fall, pp.296, 300.]] However all the statistics did not really matter in 1907. It was the perceptions of power that would be used by statesmen.[[William C. Wohlforth, ‘The Perception of Power: Russia in the Pre-1914 Balance’, World Politics, Vol. 39, No. 3, (Apr., 1987), pp.353-381, p.353.]] Thus it was the British fear of possible German hegemony that mattered:

Eyre Crowe

“Germany is defiantly aiming at a general political hegemony and maritime ascendancy, threatening the independence of her neighbours and ultimately the existence of England”[[Memorandum by Mr. Eyre Crowe, January 1 1907. Gooch, BD III, p.417.]]

Germany was generally perceived as being the primary threat to the system being the most aggressive power and having the greatest military capabilities. From a balance of power perspective it makes sense that an Anglo-Russian Rapprochement occurred when it did. France and Russia together had been enough to balance Germany however Russia’s collapse in 1905 meant that Britain’s weight had to be brought in to maintain the balance.[[Paul A. Papayoanou, ‘Interdependence, Institutions, and the Balance of power: Britain, Germany, and World War I’, International Security, Vol. 20, No. 4, (Spring, 1996), pp.42-76, pp.53-54.]]

The rise of Germany was due to unification and expanding industrial power. Unification meant that Germany was the most powerful European state in place of Prussia, the weakest.[[Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic change and military conflict from 1500 to 2000, Fontana Press, London, 1989, p.242.]] The Kaiser thought that Germany had to have a Navy in line with its new economic power. Naval rivalry was enforced by the general feeling within Germany that Germany must colonise due to geographical constraints on her population.[[Paul Kennedy, ‘The Kaiser and German Weltpolitik: reflections of Wilhelm II’s place in the making of German Foreign Policy’, John C.G. Röhl & Nicolaus Sombart eds., Kaiser Wilhelm II New Interpretations, Cambridge, 1982, pp.143-168, p.149.]] Both Britain and Germany realised that:

“(1)The more we arm at sea, the more we push England into the arms of France…
(4) it is a threat and a challenge to England to say openly that the armaments are directed against England.”[[Holstein to Maximilian von Brandt, 20 November 1906, Rich, Correspondence, p.449.]]

The Kaiser’s impatient erratic policies, continually setting off crises were another problem in Anglo-German relations. It was the Kaiser who created challenges to Britain in Congo, Samoa and Transvaal, and aimed, even if in the far future, of becoming the colonial successor to Britain was bound to result in a clash.[[Kennedy, Kaiser, p155, 158-9.]]

Kaiser Wilhelm had been engaging in secret diplomacy in an attempt to create a continental wide alliance against Britain. He persuaded the Tsar while on his yacht to sign a secret alliance on the 24th July 1905 in Björkö Sound.[[Sidney B. Fay, ‘The Kaiser’s Secret Negotiations with the Tsar, 1904-5’, The American Historical Review, Vol. 24, No.1, (Oct., 1918), pp.48-72, p.48.]] With it Wilhelm promised Nicholas “The dual alliance combining with the triple Alliance gives us a Quintupel Alliance” in which “even Japan may feel inclined to join it.” Given Wilhelm’s earlier attempts to encourage an Anglo-Russian war with declarations like “India’s loss is their death stroke”[[27 July 1905, 17 November 1904 N.F. Grant ed., The Kaiser’s Letters to the Tsar, London, pp.191-192, 148.]] the alliance was obviously directed against Britain. For Wilhelm, once the alliance was concluded either France would act as he hoped creating a continental alliance or else he would have detached France from Russia.[[Fay, Secret, p.52.]] Germany’s aim was to create a peaceful hegemony in Europe. This was also the aim also in attempts to force France into dependence on Germany by challenging France in Morocco.[[A.J.P. Taylor, The Struggle for Mastery in Europe, 1848-1918, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1971., p.427.]] Britain realised Germany’s aims and the dangers of not supporting France in any crisis:

Sir Edward Grey

“If France is left it the lurch an agreement or alliance between France, Germany and Russia in the near future is certain. This…is the Kaisers ideal, France and Russia becoming satellites within the German system.”[[Memorandum by Sir Edward Grey: Febuary 20 1906 (Notes by Sir C. Hardage), Gooch, BD III, p268]]

Showing the importance of keeping Russia and France on Britain’s side.

The alliance situation also favoured an Anglo-Russian Rapprochement. Russia and France had signed an alliance in 1891 as much by Russian initiative as France’s due to increasing German designs in the near east. It is possible in longer-range plans Tsar Alexander III wished Britain to be part of an alliance that would also include Italy as well as France.[[Laurence B. Packard, ‘Russia and the Dual Alliance’, The American Historical Review, Vol. 25, No. 3, (Apr., 1920), pp.391-410, pp.402, 404, 394.]] Similarly Britain and France had patched up their differences. By 1898 France was prepared to barter its claims on Egypt for territorial compensation.[[Christopher Andrew, ‘France and the Making of the Entente Cordiale’, The Historical Journal, Vol. 10, No.1, (1967), pp.89-105, pp.89, 91.]] Germany to complement this realisation rejected Chamberlain’s overtures for an alliance by insisting Britain submit guarantees to aid Germany if attacked, while embarking on Weltpolitik making a Anglo-French agreement inevitable.[[Harold Nicolson, ‘The Origins and Development of the Anglo-French Entente’, International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), Vol. 30, No. 4, (Oct., 1954), pp.407-416, pp.409, 411-412.]] In December 1902 rebellion in Morocco made Britain willing to support France therefore a full agreement was possible.[[Andrew, France, p.101.]] Meanwhile Edwards VII’s visit to Paris changed public opinion in the two countries from being frosty to being cordial.[[Nicolson, Entente, p.411.]] From the outset the French “hoped one day to bring about an understanding between Russia and Great Britain.”[[Sir E. Monson to the Marquess of Lansdowne: November 9 1904, Gooch, BD III, p.11.]] As early as 1887 in Dieppe the French had mentioned the possibility of a triple entente.[[Packard, Dual, p.399.]] This hope quickly became official French policy:

Sir F Bertie

“It would continue to be friendship and intimate relations with England and alliance with Russia, and the French Government earnestly trusted that an understanding would be come to between His Majesty’s Government and the Russian Government on the various questions at issue between them.”[[Sir F Bertie to Sir Edward Grey: October 27 1906, Gooch, BD III, p393]]

The Russo-Japanese war proved the Anglo-French entente could survive a crisis in which France and Britain would naturally be on opposite sides, the entente also provided a way for France to persuade her other allies that a triple entente was desirable.[[Keith Neilson, Britain and the Last Tsar: British Policy and Russia 1894-1917, Oxford, 1995, p264]]

The national level of analysis focuses on the importance of domestic politics on the formation of foreign policy. Jack Snyder identifies several myths that cause states to pursue imperial expansion. First, that conquest means power. Second, taking the resources of the periphery creates security. Third, that the best defence is offence, a fear of a domino effect. And fourth, threats make other states compliant creating bandwagoning. Imperialism is made by narrow domestic political coalitions such as economic sectors and bureaucracies that have an interest in expansion. And is justified to the public through control of the press.[[ Jack Snyder, Myths of Empire, Domestic Politics and International Ambition, Ithaca, 1991, pp.2-5, 35]]

The shock of the defeat against Japan forced a complete reassessment of Russian foreign policy she had been shown to have serious weaknesses domestically, financially and militarily.[[Neilson, Tsar, p267]] Many in Russia had been unwilling to accept defeat:

Savinsky

“It also pained me that Russia, so great and powerful, should be invited to enter peace negotiations with Japan, just at a critical moment when their efforts and resources were perhaps at the point of exhaustion.”[[A. Savinsky, Recollections of a Russian Diplomat, London, 1927, p128]]

It was international opinion that forced Russia into negotiations, Witte the Russian negotiator managed to effectively dictate the terms of the peace despite Russia’s loss of her navy, one army captured and another routed.[[Richard Connaughton, Rising Sun and Tumbling Bear, Russia’s war with Japan, London, 2003, p342-344]] Russia had however been badly weakened in terms of balance of power this would have been the ideal time for Germany to strike, Russia had reached her relative low in 1894 while Germany her high in 1902.[[Kennedy, Rise and Fall, p311]]

Germany was dismissive of Russia’s power after 1905 particularly emphasising Russia’s weak societal cohesion.[[Wohlforth, Perception, p361]] This weak societal cohesion was caused by the 1905 revolution. On 9th January troops had opened fire on a peaceful protest killing over a hundred sparking revolution. During this revolution there were numerous peasant revolts and in October, general strikes including on the railways, brought Russia to the point of collapse resulting in a promise of a constitution and an elected Duma.[[Hugh Seton-Watson, The Russian Empire 1801-1917, Oxford, 1989, pp598-600]] In 1905 Iswolsky believed that “The interior situation dominates everything”.[[Helene Iswolsky, ‘The Fatefull Years: 1906-1911’, Russian Review, Vol.28, No.2, (Apr., 1969), pp.191-206, p195]] It is not surprising that other Great Powers believed “internal disorders began to undermine Russia’s whole position as a power that must be reckoned with”.[[Memorandum by Mr. Eyre Crowe, January 1 1907. Gooch, BD III, p399]] Britain however was the country that was least influenced by these internal events believing that Russia would still make a good account of herself in a war in Europe in which public support could be assured.[[Wohlforth, Perception, p356]] This meant Britain was in a good position to take advantage to get a settlement as “Russia had had difficulties with every country but England, who had acted loyally and cordially with Russia.”[[Mr. Spring-Rice to Sir Edward Grey January 26 1906, G.P. Gooch & Harold Temperley eds., British Documents on the Origins of the War 1898-1914, Vol. IV The Anglo-Russian Rapprochement 1903-7, London, 1929, p222]]

Similarly the Boer War had brought home to Britain the difficulties of isolation forcing, when Lansdowne took over the Foreign Office, a re-examination of Foreign policy.[[Neilson, Tsar, p205]] The incident of the Kruger telegram could have been a lot worse as “the Kaiser wanted to intimidate England… he planned to support the Boers with German colonial troops”.[[Rich , I, Memoirs, p185]] The Kruger telegram was the first time Britain had clashed with Germany on an issue vital to British security.[[Paul Kennedy, The Realities Behind Diplomacy, Background Influences on British External Policy 1865-1980, London, 1995, p108]] More serious was the Boer war itself as continental public opinion was united against Britain, particularly German:

Valentine Chirol

“the hostility of the German people may not have been greater than of other continental nations, but they have shown more ingenuity in driving it home”[[Valentine Chirol to Holstein 28 December 1901, Rich, Correspondence, p243]]

Britain’s defences at home were severely weakened leading to an invasion scare.[[Kennedy, Diplomacy, p113]] More crises at the same time, such as the Boxers, forced Britain to look for alliances. Snyder contends that Britain’s aggressiveness in the scramble for Africa had resulted in the Boer war and every major European power being against her, creating a fear in Britain of an erosion of the naval balance which in turn causes a retrenchment of Britain’s position through Alliances.[[Snyder, Myths, p7]]

British public opinion slowly came round to the view that a deal with Russia over Asia was a sensible idea. In 1900, still at the height of antagonism with Russia an article in Fortnightly Review argued:

J.W. Gambier

“In looking around the world one cannot see a single power less antagonistic to our commercial interests than Russia.

The world is wide enough for us both…

The closer and more seriously this question of an Anglo-Russian friendship is studied, the more clearly does it stand out as the only possible guarantee of the peace of the world.”[[J.W. Gambier, ‘A Plea for Peace – an Anglo-Russian Alliance’, Fortnightly Review, (Jul-Dec., 1900), pp.998-1008, p1002, 1006-8]]

Throughout 1906 and 1907 the press speculated about an agreement. When it came the press gave very positive reactions,

The Spectator

“The relaxation of the strain which is brought about by the convention is thoroughly grateful to both sides… [in the interests] of the peace of the world”[[‘The Anglo-Russian Convention’, The Spectator, Sept 28 1907, Vol. 99, (Jul. 6-Dec. 25, 1907), London, p420]]

In Britain public opinion did make a difference, it could provide an easy get out clause to justify to other governments why Britain was not supporting them on an issue. Britain was therefore seen as being inconsistent by the more autocratic powers; Britain’s foreign policy was ultimately accountable to the public even if not decided upon publicly.[[Charmley, Splendid, p198-199]] In Snyders’ theory a pluralistic press is needed to guarantee a broad range of views preventing an information monopoly.[[Snyder, Myths, p39]]

In Britain the right conditions were in existence to counter any more imperial expansion. Britain had a pluralistic press and a parliament empowered to ask questions of the bureaucracy preventing any information monopoly. Early industrialisation created diffuse economic interests this made it easier for the elite to adjust to a slow loss of power.[[Snyder, Myths, p55, 59]] Democracy acted as a check on concentrated interests, voters would only support profitable imperialism,[[ibid, p49]] the Boer war had shown imperialism was no longer profitable forcing Britain to pull back from over-expansion and create alliances to retrench her position. 1905 acted in a similar way in Russia, helping to break the elite with the creation of the Duma and forcing retrenchment that forced rapprochement with Britain.

In Allison’s model of bureaucratic politics foreign policy decisions result from negotiation between various governmental bureaucracies, to identify the cause of foreign policy the players, coalitions, bargains and compromises must be identified.[[Brian Ripley, ‘Cognition, Culture and Bureaucratic Politics’, in Laura Neack, Jeanne A.K. Hey and Patrick J. Haney eds., Foreign Policy Analysis, Continuity and Change in Its Second Generation, Englewood Cliffs, 1995, pp.85-91, p88]]

On the contrary some argue the policies of a country cannot be explained without knowing the personal goals and beliefs of the leaders of a country. These individuals also affect the reactions of other states. This is the Great Men theory of history with an emphasis on the individual level of analysis. Byman and Pollack have four basic hypotheses. It is individuals who set the intentions of the state; they can transform them or magnify already latent intentions. The competence of its individuals counts towards a states influence and military power; they build alliances, perceive threats, and create military strategy. Individuals decide how a state’s resources will be used in pursuit of the goals they have created; it is individuals, on one side at least, who decide whether to go to war or negotiate. And finally individuals affect how an opposing state will react; they can either be charismatic and persuasive or bullying and aggressive, the opposing state’s individuals will respond based upon the attitudes of the first state’s individuals towards them.[[Daniel L. Byman & Kenneth M. Pollack, ‘Let us now Praise Great Men, Bringing the Statesmen Back In’, International Security, vol. 25, No. 4, (Spring, 2001), pp.107-146, pp.108-9, 134-5.]]

At the individual level the figures on the British side are more important than the Russian as it was Britain who pushed for an agreement. The change to Grey in the Foreign Office marked a move from Lansdowne in terms of attitude towards Germany from attempt at settlement to a hard line.[[Lyle A McGeoch, ‘On the Road to War: British Foreign Policy in Transition, 1905-1906’, The Review of Politics, Vol. 35, No. 2, (Apr., 1973), pp.204-218. p207]] Grey was rigid in his policy of firm support for France: “My own opinion was that if Germany forced war on France in order to destroy the Anglo-French Agreement, we ought to go to the help of France.”[[Viscount Grey of Fallodon, Twenty-Five Years 1892-1916, Vol. 1, London, 1925, p77]] This was in part due to his inexperience. This was emphasised, as Grey was the only member of the Cabinet, apart from Lord Ripon, the leader of the Lords, who had any interest in Foreign affairs.[[McGeoch, Transition, p208, 211]] Grey believed that “If we were to get out of the old, bad rut in which we had so often come to the verge of war with Russia, we had to work for a definite agreement.”[[Grey, Twenty-Five, p152]]

It was Grey who was kept trying to speed up the slow negotiations, adding in friendly suggestions such as the British fleet visiting Kronstadt which had to be dropped due to unrest in Russia and Liberal opposition in Britain.[[Churchill, 1907, p130-131]] Or else trying to prevent negotiations stopping altogether, shown in a letter to Nicolson:

Sir Edward Grey

“I do not wish negotiations to go to sleep. But, on the other hand, we must avoid raising in M. Isvolsky’s mind the suspicion that we wish to force the pace in order to take advantage of Russia’s present situation.”[[Grey, Twenty-Five, p161]]

Grey finally persuaded the Russians to fast movement on the agreement by implying that Britain would no longer confront Russia at the straits[[Churchill, 1907, p158]]:

Sir Edward Grey

“I [Grey] had felt all through these negotiations that the good relations with Russia meant that our old policy of closing the Straits against her, and throwing our weight against her at any conference must be abandoned.”[[Memorandum by Sir Edward Grey, Gooch, BD IV, p280]]

However at the same time he managed to keep it out of the area of negotiation as it would force what was a bilateral negotiation to be turned into a general European matter, or at least the French would have to be brought in.[[William A. Langer, ‘Russia, the Straits Question, and the European Powers, 1904-8’, The English Historical Review, Vol. 44, No. 273, (Jan., 1929), pp.59-85, p68]] Though for Grey “the worst is that things would be said in Parliament, and in our Press, which would mightily offend the Tsar and the Russian Government”.[[Grey, Twenty-Five, p164]]

Grey was therefore instrumental in the making of the treaty however it was not him who negotiated it. That fell to Sir Arthur Nicolson. Nicolson held similar views to the other main players in the foreign office[[Churchill, 1907, p124]] this was:

Sir Arthur Nicolson

“in dealing with both France and Russia, we had honestly no other object than to place our relations on a safer and more secure basis… [not] to disturb the peace or to impair the relations between themselves and Germany”[[Harold Nicolson, Sir Arthur Nicolson, BART. First Lord Carnock, A Study in the Old Diplomacy, London, 1930, p236]]

It was up to Nicolson to do the negotiating, unlike previous foreign secretaries Grey allowed his civil servants to give advice.[[Steiner, Hardinge, p417]] The instructions Nicolson were given were not in the form of a treaty but simply giving the government line allowing Nicolson considerable room to manoeuvre. It was up to Nicholson to slow down the negotiations when the Russians could not keep up with the pace Grey wished.[[Churchill, 1907, p144-145]]

On the Russian side the main player was the Foreign Minister Alexander Iswolsky. The British Ambassador to Denmark (where Iswolsky had previously been posted) thought, “Isvolsky had held the scales pretty evenly balanced between his French and German colleagues”.[[Sir A. Johnstone to Sir Edward Grey: May 27 1906, Gooch, BD IV, p235]] Iswolsky was a liberal, had supported the creation of Duma and asked to resign when it was dissolved,[[Iswolsky, Fatefull, p193, 194, 196]] this would obviously make him a more palatable negotiating partner for the British. This made it all the more important that Iswolsky stood up to the Russian bureaucracies, it was Iswolsky who had to overcome the attitudes of the military party.[[Churchill, 1907, p147, 149]] In Greys’ words:

Sir Edward Grey

“It is no wonder that the Russian Foreign Minister had some difficulty in getting military authorities in Russia to give up something of real potential value to them, while we gave up what was of little or no practical value to us.”[[Grey, Twenty-Five, p160]]

Thus it was Iswolsky who was the negotiator who was being bold, carrying on with little support. Iswolsky was still in the minority when, on the 24th August the final proposal was presented to the council of ministers, which they rejected, as Britain could not offer any more concessions, it was thus entirely down to Iswolsky to turn their views around which he did by the 18th.[[Churchill, 1907, p174-175]]

Krasner’s criticism of Allison’s model seems to apply in the case of bureaucratic politics in relation to the 1907 agreement. Witte is an example of a decision maker not standing where he is sitting.[[Stephen D. Krasner, ‘Are Bureaucracies Important?’, Foreign Policy, No. 7, (Summer, 1972), pp.159-179, p165]] He opposed the convention despite his interests in commerce with Britain and “I soon perceived that only two things could save the dynasty… namely, a large foreign loan”[[Abraham Yarmolinsky trans., The Memoirs of Count Witte, London, 1921, p285]] that Britain could provide. In Russia the Tsar had complete control, although he did not take a particularly active role the bureaucracy was always very sensitive to his values. Meanwhile Campbell-Bannerman’s appointment of Grey reflected the wish of his Liberal Government to come to an agreement with Russia, an example of the chief executive setting the rules and choosing who heads the bureaucracies.[[Krasner, Bureaucracies, pp.166, 169]] The bureaucracies, such as the Indian Government, that were following their own interests were just bypassed.

The individuals certainly had an impact. Edward Grey and Iswolsky magnified the slow movement towards rapprochement that already existed. Without Nicolson’s skill at negotiating along with Grey and Hardinge’s ability to come up with solutions to stalling points the Convention would not have been agreed. Iswolsky and the British kept Nicholas on a path to rapprochement. In this case the individuals may well have tipped the scales enough to create the convention, however they were not the primary cause.

This increasing threat caused by Russia also makes a deal between the two powers more necessary. There was becoming a need for an agreement on the boarders of the two empires to prevent accidental incursions or clashes in the areas between the empires territories that could create conflict. While both sides saw each other expanding their territories and influence but were not yet rubbing up against each other there was reason for fear but no reason for compromise. This was changing.

Bülow and Holstein were against, noting “All the negotiations on the English alliance…coincide with the Boer War, that is, with a period of English weakness.”[[Norman Rich & M.H. Fisher eds, The Holstein Papers, The Memoirs, Diaries and Correspondence of Friedrich von Holstein 1837-1909, I, Memoirs and Political Observations, Cambridge, 1963, p.184.]] Moreover at precisely the same time Germany was turning to Weltpolitik making domestic politics unfavourable to any alliance.[[Paul Kennedy, ‘German World Policy and the Alliance Negotiations with England, 1897-1900’, The Journal of Modern History, Vol. 45, No. 4, (Dec., 1973), pp.605-625, pp605-606.]] “The Kaiser wants a fleet like that of England and wants to direct his entire domestic policy to that end, i.e. to a fight.”[[Holstein to Paul von Hatzfeldt 14 April 1897, Norman Rich & M.H. Fisher eds, The Holstein Papers, The Memoirs, Diaries and Correspondence of Friedrich von Holstein 1837-1909, IV Correspondence 1897-1909, Cambridge, 1963, p28]] This was obviously not compatible with any moves towards an Alliance.

Russia was not the only nation causing the overstretch for Britain. Germany was determined to get compensation for any colonial changes:

Holstein

“in case England seized Portuguese territory, for instance Delagoa Bay, our chauvinists would make a furious attack on any policy by which Germany received compensation in China and not in the Portuguese African possessions as well.”[[ Holstein to Paul von Hatzfeldt 12 April 1897, Rich, Correspondence, p24]]

While this was ongoing the Russian and French fleets looked much less dangerous. The Franco Russian alliance was directed against Germany and Austria not Britain making their fleets less threatening.

Russia and Britain were fortunate that Germany did not try to prevent their entente. Bülow, the German chancellor, believed of Britain’s protestations that

Bülow

“The conventions with Russia had concerned the security of the Indian frontier, they were a guarantee of Anglo-Russian peace, and therefore a contribution to the peace of the whole world.”[[Prince von Bülow, Memoirs, Vol III 1903-9, London, 1931, p297-298]]

Bülow did his best to calm the Kaiser and Public’s justifiable fears explaining that encirclement “did not alarm me in the least.” He explained that:

Bülow

“We had been encircled… ever since the treaty of Verdun-that is to say for one thousand and sixty-five years…But difficulties are made to be overcome, with calm, with prudence and common-sense.”[[ibid, p309-310]]

He had been similarly relaxed over the entente cordiale.[[Fay, Secret, p54]]

The lack of German response can be explained by Germany’s economic interdependence with Britain, as an example one fifth of Germanys demand for raw materials was supplied by the British Empire, financed by the city of London.[[Paul A. Papayoanou, ‘Interdependence, Institutions, and the Balance of power: Britain, Germany, and World War I’, International Security, Vol. 20, No. 4, (Spring, 1996), p55]] Similarly Germany was confident of her relationship of monarchical solidarity with Russia, and that Russia and Britain would inevitably clash.[[Kennedy, Alliance, p611-612]] Despite a tacit agreement between Grey and Iswalsky over the straits in 1908 Holstein believed:

Holstein

“For an understanding between England and Russia is only conceivable if England is either indifferent or hostile to Turkey.”[[Holstein to Bernhard von Bülow, 8 October 1908, Rich, Correspondence, p577]]

Reforms however allowed the Foreign Office officials much more power, as did Grey’s inexperience in Foreign policy and greater workload due to sitting in the commons. Almost all the Foreign Office staff, from Sir Charles Hardinge the head of the Foreign Office staff down were pro French after 1906 and therefore for a agreement with Russia over Germany.[[Lyle A McGeoch, ‘On the Road to War: British Foreign Policy in Transition, 1905-1906’, The Review of Politics, Vol. 35, No. 2, (Apr., 1973), pp.204-218. p212]] This was important, as it was the British Foreign Office that worked out the substance of the agreements, making the drafts and working out how to get around sticking points,[[Steiner, Hardinge, p418]] necessary as the Russian Government could not be the side to take the initiative.

However in autocratic Russia coordination of departments was poor and the emperor had the last say on everything, the bureaucracy could not make policy.[[Hans Rogger, Russia in the Age of Modernisation and Revolution 1881-1917, London, 1983, p47-48]] In Russia the leading Ambassadors and the Foreign office were in support of a move towards strengthening the alliance with France by adding close co-operation with Britain.[[Iswalsky, Fateful, p200]] Even ministers relied upon the Tsar, always having to see what way the Tsar was leaning on a policy, and following it even if the minister privately objected so if the Tsar came down on the side of the diplomatic corps the military side of the bureaucracy would comply.

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