The agreement between Russia and Great Britain in 1907 was inevitable?
States do not always react the same way in essentially similar situations, what influenced the way a state went can be seen through decision making analysis. Britain at the turn of the twentieth century need not have moved into an entente with France and Russia, she could have joined with the triple Alliance as Joseph Chamberlain and Balfour wished. According to Robert Jervis decision makers “believe both that others may not behave as they would and that the decision-makers within the other state differ among themselves.” Therefore it is necessary to look at problems through different levels of analysis, decision-makers decide their policy based upon what they believe to be most important: another may decide a different area is more important and hence make a different decision. Jervis identifies four levels of analysis: the level of individual decision-making, bureaucracy, the nature of the state, and the international environment. There is not an agreement on this, Kenneth Waltz for example opts for three levels; the individual, which is completely rejected as irrelevant, the unit level whose interactions make the structural level. The most important of these is the structure of the international system; states are constrained by the system. The Anglo-Russian convention was simply an agreement to prevent any conflict in Persia, Afghanistan and Tibet, but both sides wanted it for European reasons, regaining prestige and fear of Germany. In my essay/debate I will be looking at the reasons behind the Anglo-Russian Convention and the rapprochement it entailed. I will therefore mostly be looking at Britain and Russia however I will also look at Germany: as the motive for the rapprochement, why it did not try to prevent such an entente, and why Britain did not go the other way to align with the triple alliance. In each of the levels of analysis I will give some theory but will mostly give historical analysis. I will first look at the competition between Russia and England, particularly in Asia. In the international environment I will be looking at the rise of Germany, the changing balance of power, splendid isolation and the recurring threat of continental leagues and the alliances that were already in existence acting as a pull on Britain and Russia to come together. Changes in the domestic situation in Russia and Britain included a realisation that they were overstretched so could not compete over such a large area, revolution in Russia, the Boer war fought by Britain, and the influence of public opinion. I will also at this point look at Germany. Bureaucracy in Russia opposed settlement while in Britain the Foreign office was supportive. I will finally look at the roles played by important individuals in the settlement before concluding with the consequences of the Convention.
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International level: Structure of the International System
International level: Balance of Power
In looking at the balance of power international relations scholars tend to look at economics and defence spending.[[for figures see: Paul Kennedy, ‘The First World War and the International Power System’, International Security, Vol. 9, No. 1, (Summer, 1984), pp.7-40, A.J.P. Taylor, The Struggle for Mastery in Europe, 1848-1918, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1971. pp.xix-xxxvi., ‘National Material Capabilities’ (v3.02), Correlates of War project, accessed 26/11/06 (website said to reference article) – Singer J. David, ‘Reconstructing the Correlates of War Dataset on Material Capabilities of States, 1816-1985’, International Interactions, Vol 14, (1987), pp.115-132.]] Paul Kennedy for example argues the triumph of a state is a product “of the way in which that state’s economy had been rising or falling, relative to the other leading nations, in the decades preceding the actual conflict.”[[Kennedy, Rise and Fall, p.xv.]]
In terms of economics Germany was becoming the top European nation its Iron and Steel production in 1907 was 11.6 million tons compared to 12 million tons for Russia, Britain and France combined.[[Correlates of War]] Her immense economy allowed Germany to spend very large amounts on the military without straining the economy. She had an immense lead in newer industries for example chemicals and electricals. Economiclly Britain was in decline although still ahead in older industries such as coal production and shipping[[Kennedy, World War, pp.18, 21.]] and even if not on top industrially Britain was still the greatest financial Power. However if one looks at industrial growth Russia was doing best growing at a rate of 5% per year from 1860-1913, and she was the worlds second largest oil producer.[[Kennedy, Rise and Fall, pp.296, 300.]] However all the statistics did not really matter in 1907. It was the perceptions of power that would be used by statesmen.[[William C. Wohlforth, ‘The Perception of Power: Russia in the Pre-1914 Balance’, World Politics, Vol. 39, No. 3, (Apr., 1987), pp.353-381, p.353.]] Thus it was the British fear of possible German hegemony that mattered:
Germany was generally perceived as being the primary threat to the system being the most aggressive power and having the greatest military capabilities. From a balance of power perspective it makes sense that an Anglo-Russian Rapprochement occurred when it did. France and Russia together had been enough to balance Germany however Russia’s collapse in 1905 meant that Britain’s weight had to be brought in to maintain the balance.[[Paul A. Papayoanou, ‘Interdependence, Institutions, and the Balance of power: Britain, Germany, and World War I’, International Security, Vol. 20, No. 4, (Spring, 1996), pp.42-76, pp.53-54.]]
International level: Naval competition
The Kaiser’s impatient erratic policies, continually setting off crises were another problem in Anglo-German relations. It was the Kaiser who created challenges to Britain in Congo, Samoa and Transvaal, and aimed, even if in the far future, of becoming the colonial successor to Britain was bound to result in a clash.[[Kennedy, Kaiser, p155, 158-9.]]
International level: Fear of a continental league
Showing the importance of keeping Russia and France on Britain’s side.
International level: French Encouragement
The Russo-Japanese war proved the Anglo-French entente could survive a crisis in which France and Britain would naturally be on opposite sides, the entente also provided a way for France to persuade her other allies that a triple entente was desirable.[[Keith Neilson, Britain and the Last Tsar: British Policy and Russia 1894-1917, Oxford, 1995, p264]]
National level: Introduction
National level: Russo-Japanese War and 1905 revolution
It was international opinion that forced Russia into negotiations, Witte the Russian negotiator managed to effectively dictate the terms of the peace despite Russia’s loss of her navy, one army captured and another routed.[[Richard Connaughton, Rising Sun and Tumbling Bear, Russia’s war with Japan, London, 2003, p342-344]] Russia had however been badly weakened in terms of balance of power this would have been the ideal time for Germany to strike, Russia had reached her relative low in 1894 while Germany her high in 1902.[[Kennedy, Rise and Fall, p311]]
Germany was dismissive of Russia’s power after 1905 particularly emphasising Russia’s weak societal cohesion.[[Wohlforth, Perception, p361]] This weak societal cohesion was caused by the 1905 revolution. On 9th January troops had opened fire on a peaceful protest killing over a hundred sparking revolution. During this revolution there were numerous peasant revolts and in October, general strikes including on the railways, brought Russia to the point of collapse resulting in a promise of a constitution and an elected Duma.[[Hugh Seton-Watson, The Russian Empire 1801-1917, Oxford, 1989, pp598-600]] In 1905 Iswolsky believed that “The interior situation dominates everything”.[[Helene Iswolsky, ‘The Fatefull Years: 1906-1911’, Russian Review, Vol.28, No.2, (Apr., 1969), pp.191-206, p195]] It is not surprising that other Great Powers believed “internal disorders began to undermine Russia’s whole position as a power that must be reckoned with”.[[Memorandum by Mr. Eyre Crowe, January 1 1907. Gooch, BD III, p399]] Britain however was the country that was least influenced by these internal events believing that Russia would still make a good account of herself in a war in Europe in which public support could be assured.[[Wohlforth, Perception, p356]] This meant Britain was in a good position to take advantage to get a settlement as “Russia had had difficulties with every country but England, who had acted loyally and cordially with Russia.”[[Mr. Spring-Rice to Sir Edward Grey January 26 1906, G.P. Gooch & Harold Temperley eds., British Documents on the Origins of the War 1898-1914, Vol. IV The Anglo-Russian Rapprochement 1903-7, London, 1929, p222]]
National level: Boer War
Britain’s defences at home were severely weakened leading to an invasion scare.[[Kennedy, Diplomacy, p113]] More crises at the same time, such as the Boxers, forced Britain to look for alliances. Snyder contends that Britain’s aggressiveness in the scramble for Africa had resulted in the Boer war and every major European power being against her, creating a fear in Britain of an erosion of the naval balance which in turn causes a retrenchment of Britain’s position through Alliances.[[Snyder, Myths, p7]]
National level: British public opinion
Throughout 1906 and 1907 the press speculated about an agreement. When it came the press gave very positive reactions,
In Britain public opinion did make a difference, it could provide an easy get out clause to justify to other governments why Britain was not supporting them on an issue. Britain was therefore seen as being inconsistent by the more autocratic powers; Britain’s foreign policy was ultimately accountable to the public even if not decided upon publicly.[[Charmley, Splendid, p198-199]] In Snyders’ theory a pluralistic press is needed to guarantee a broad range of views preventing an information monopoly.[[Snyder, Myths, p39]]
National level: Summary
Bureaucratic politics and Great Men Thesis: Introduction
On the contrary some argue the policies of a country cannot be explained without knowing the personal goals and beliefs of the leaders of a country. These individuals also affect the reactions of other states. This is the Great Men theory of history with an emphasis on the individual level of analysis. Byman and Pollack have four basic hypotheses. It is individuals who set the intentions of the state; they can transform them or magnify already latent intentions. The competence of its individuals counts towards a states influence and military power; they build alliances, perceive threats, and create military strategy. Individuals decide how a state’s resources will be used in pursuit of the goals they have created; it is individuals, on one side at least, who decide whether to go to war or negotiate. And finally individuals affect how an opposing state will react; they can either be charismatic and persuasive or bullying and aggressive, the opposing state’s individuals will respond based upon the attitudes of the first state’s individuals towards them.[[Daniel L. Byman & Kenneth M. Pollack, ‘Let us now Praise Great Men, Bringing the Statesmen Back In’, International Security, vol. 25, No. 4, (Spring, 2001), pp.107-146, pp.108-9, 134-5.]]
Great Men: Sir Edward Grey
It was Grey who was kept trying to speed up the slow negotiations, adding in friendly suggestions such as the British fleet visiting Kronstadt which had to be dropped due to unrest in Russia and Liberal opposition in Britain.[[Churchill, 1907, p130-131]] Or else trying to prevent negotiations stopping altogether, shown in a letter to Nicolson:
Grey finally persuaded the Russians to fast movement on the agreement by implying that Britain would no longer confront Russia at the straits[[Churchill, 1907, p158]]:
However at the same time he managed to keep it out of the area of negotiation as it would force what was a bilateral negotiation to be turned into a general European matter, or at least the French would have to be brought in.[[William A. Langer, ‘Russia, the Straits Question, and the European Powers, 1904-8’, The English Historical Review, Vol. 44, No. 273, (Jan., 1929), pp.59-85, p68]] Though for Grey “the worst is that things would be said in Parliament, and in our Press, which would mightily offend the Tsar and the Russian Government”.[[Grey, Twenty-Five, p164]]
Great Men: Sir Arthur Nicolson
It was up to Nicolson to do the negotiating, unlike previous foreign secretaries Grey allowed his civil servants to give advice.[[Steiner, Hardinge, p417]] The instructions Nicolson were given were not in the form of a treaty but simply giving the government line allowing Nicolson considerable room to manoeuvre. It was up to Nicholson to slow down the negotiations when the Russians could not keep up with the pace Grey wished.[[Churchill, 1907, p144-145]]
Great Men: Iswolsky
Thus it was Iswolsky who was the negotiator who was being bold, carrying on with little support. Iswolsky was still in the minority when, on the 24th August the final proposal was presented to the council of ministers, which they rejected, as Britain could not offer any more concessions, it was thus entirely down to Iswolsky to turn their views around which he did by the 18th.[[Churchill, 1907, p174-175]]
This meant that Iswolsky could potentially be persuaded by the opposing bureaucracy not to back the agreement.
Bureaucratic Politics and Great Men: Summary
The individuals certainly had an impact. Edward Grey and Iswolsky magnified the slow movement towards rapprochement that already existed. Without Nicolson’s skill at negotiating along with Grey and Hardinge’s ability to come up with solutions to stalling points the Convention would not have been agreed. Iswolsky and the British kept Nicholas on a path to rapprochement. In this case the individuals may well have tipped the scales enough to create the convention, however they were not the primary cause.
International level: Anglo Russian Competition
Russia turned to Central Asia due to the disappointment of the straits convention 1856, with Central Asia being the only direction now open after the closing of the Near East.[[Jennifer Siegel, Endgame, Britain, Russia and the Final Struggle for Central Asia, London, 2002, p.3.]] The only way for the Russia to strike at Britain was through India, enabling Russia to counter British naval supremacy that allowed a strike at the heart of Russia as in the Crimean war. It was also defensive to create a barrier against any British advance, after all Britain had engaged in three wars in a row around Russia’s periphery in the 1850’s.[[David Gillard, The Struggle for Asia 1828-1914, A study in British and Russian imperialism, London, 1977, pp.96, 108, 116.]] As with other imperial powers there was a civilising element
Britain was particularly fearful of the Russian construction of railways into Central Asia:
By the turn of the century fear of the Russian menace was becoming more threatening when combined with a growing power of Germany and colonial incidents with France, newspapers were even helping to undermine the British position claiming Russian government was more humane than the Raj.[[James, Raj, p.389.]]
International level: Anglo-German Alliance possibility
National level: Both Britain and Russia overstretched
Russia’s position was not much better. In the Far East the single track Trans-Siberian was the only lifeline, and it had a gap around lake Baikal, it took more than a month to deploy a battalion from Moscow to Mukden, and then it had to be kept supplied.[[Richard Connaughton, Rising Sun and Tumbling Bear, Russia’s war with Japan, London, 2003, p29-31]] Russia was spending almost as much as Britain on a manufacturing base less than half the size.[[Kennedy, World War, p8, 12, 17]] This meant that both sides were a threat to the other and conflict could occur at the very edge of empire where neither side had much central control.
While this was ongoing the Russian and French fleets looked much less dangerous. The Franco Russian alliance was directed against Germany and Austria not Britain making their fleets less threatening.
National level: German policies could derail an agreement
Ultimately Only the Kaiser made any reaction and his ludicrous attempt to create a German-American-Chinese entente was bound to end in failure. This was based upon Wilhelm’s fears of a ‘yellow peril’ that Japan would dominate Asia thereby threatening the world.[[Luella J. Hall, ‘The Abortive German-American-Chinese Entente of 1907-8’, The Journal of Modern History, Vol. 1, No. 2, (Jun., 1929), pp.219-235, p222]] In his telegrams to Nicholas he spoke plainly “They are going in for the whole of Asia, carefully preparing their blows and against the white race in general!”[[28 December 1907, Grant, letters, p239]]
Bülow did his best to calm the Kaiser and Public’s justifiable fears explaining that encirclement “did not alarm me in the least.” He explained that:
He had been similarly relaxed over the entente cordiale.[[Fay, Secret, p54]]
The lack of German response can be explained by Germany’s economic interdependence with Britain, as an example one fifth of Germanys demand for raw materials was supplied by the British Empire, financed by the city of London.[[Paul A. Papayoanou, ‘Interdependence, Institutions, and the Balance of power: Britain, Germany, and World War I’, International Security, Vol. 20, No. 4, (Spring, 1996), p55]] Similarly Germany was confident of her relationship of monarchical solidarity with Russia, and that Russia and Britain would inevitably clash.[[Kennedy, Alliance, p611-612]] Despite a tacit agreement between Grey and Iswalsky over the straits in 1908 Holstein believed:
Bureaucratic Politics: India Office against
Curzon who had been viceroy to India from 1899-1905 gave the view from India, particularly in relation to Persia, in his speech to the House of Lords in 1908:
Bureaucratic politics: Conflict in Russian bureaucracy
Great Men: Nicholas II
As an example of Nicholas’ weak mindedness: “I [Nicholas II] ask your agreement to acquaint the government of France with this project [the Bjorko treaty]” this sensible idea was probably brought about by Count Lamsdorff. However Wilhelm had changed Nicholas’ views within four days “You [Nicholas] have given me [Wilhelm] a new proof of your perfect loyalty by deciding not to inform France without my agreement.”[[Herman Bernstein, The Willy-Nicky Correspondence Being the Secret and Intimate Telegrams Exchanged Between the Kaiser and the Tsar, New York, 1918, pp.83, 88, 85]] This demonstrates how different Nicholas’ views are depending on what faction has his ear at the time. This impacted on the convention as Nicholas’ agreement was needed, thus at the start of negotiations Nicholas believed “I [Wilhelm] can well imagine that the English are, as you [Nicholas] say fiddling around you, about asia”.[[14 June 1906, Grant, Letters, p231]] By March 1907 Nicholas stated, “he had been gratified to learn… that a substantial advance had been made towards an agreement… and said this must occur.”[[Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey: March 1 1907, Gooch, BD IV, p276]] And when it came to needing his agreement Nicholas would agree if his ministers gave unanimous consent, in effect he would not decide.[[Churchill, 1907, p174-5]]
Essentially this is my bibliography. As a lot of the references I make only used summerised citations you may well need to come and look at this to work out what precicely the book or article is rather than finding the first mention of that book. This should also help anyone who is looking to do further research on the 1907 treaty or any of the surrounding topics.
Bernstein, Herman, The Willy-Nicky Correspondence Being the Secret and Intimate Telegrams Exchanged Between the Kaiser and the Tsar, New York, 1918.
Bülow, Prince von, Memoirs, Vol III 1903-9, London, 1931.
Gambier, J.W. ‘A Plea for Peace - an Anglo-Russian Alliance’, Fortnightly Review, (Jul-Dec., 1900), pp.998-1008.
Grant, N.F. ed., The Kaiser’s Letters to the Tsar, London.
Grey, Viscount of Fallodon, Twenty-Five Years 1892-1916, Vol. 1, London, 1925.
British Documents on the Origins of the War 1898-1914, Vol. III The Testing of the entente 1904-6, London, 1928.
Gooch, G.P. & Temperley, Harold eds., British Documents on the Origins of the War 1898-1914, Vol. IV The Anglo-Russian Rapprochement 1903-7, London, 1929.
Hansard, The Parliamentary debates Fourth Series, Third session of the twenty eighth parliament of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, Vol. CLXXXIII, 29 Jan.-11 Feb., London, 1908.
Lieven, Dominic ed. British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers from the Foreign Office Confidential Print, Part I from the Mid-Nineteenth Century to the First World War, Series A Russia, 1859-1914, Vol. I Russia 1859-1880, 1983.
Nicolson, Harold, Sir Arthur Nicolson, BART. First Lord Carnock, A Study in the Old Diplomacy, London, 1930.
Rich, Norman & Fisher, M.H. eds, The Holstein Papers, The Memoirs, Diaries and Correspondence of Friedrich von Holstein 1837-1909, I, Memoirs and Political Observations, Cambridge, 1963.
Rich, Norman & Fisher, M.H. eds, The Holstein Papers, The Memoirs, Diaries and Correspondence of Friedrich von Holstein 1837-1909, IV Correspondence 1897-1909, Cambridge, 1963.
Savinsky, A., Recollections of a Russian Diplomat, London, 1927.
Yarmolinsky, Abraham, trans., The Memoirs of Count Witte, London, 1921.
‘The Russians at the gates of Herat’, Science, Vol. 5, No. 117, (May 1, 1885), pp.368-369.
‘Convention Signed on August 31, 1907, between Great Britain and Russia, Containing Arrangements on the Subject of Persia, Afghanistan, and Thibet’, The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 1, No. 4, Supplement: Official Documents. (Oct., 1907), pp. 398-406.
‘The Anglo-Russian Convention’, The Spectator, Sept 28 1907, Vol. 99, (Jul. 6-Dec. 25, 1907), London.
Andrew, Christopher, ‘France and the Making of the Entente Cordiale’, The Historical Journal, Vol. 10, No.1, (1967), pp.89-105.
Byman, Daniel L. & Pollack, Kenneth M., ‘Let us now Praise Great Men, Bringing the Statesmen Back In’, International Security, vol. 25, No. 4, (Spring, 2001), pp.107-146.
Charmley, John, Splendid Isolation? Britain, the Balance of Power and the Origins of the First World War, London, 1999.
Churchill, Rogers Platt, The Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907, Cedar Rapids, 1939.
Connaughton, Richard, Rising Sun and Tumbling Bear, Russia’s war with Japan, London, 2003.
Fay, Sidney B., ‘The Kaiser’s Secret Negotiations with the Tsar, 1904-5’, The American Historical Review, Vol. 24, No.1, (Oct., 1918), pp.48-72.
Gillard, David, The Struggle for Asia 1828-1914, A study in British and Russian imperialism, London, 1977.
Hall, Luella J., ‘The Abortive German-American-Chinese Entente of 1907-8’, The Journal of Modern History, Vol. 1, No. 2, (Jun., 1929), pp.219-235.
Howard, Christopher, Splendid Isolation A study of ideas coincerning Britain’s international position and foreign policy during the later years of the third Marquis of Salisbury, London, 1967.
Iswolsky, Helene, ‘The Fatefull Years: 1906-1911’, Russian Review, Vol.28, No.2, (Apr., 1969), pp.191-206.
Jackson, Robert H., ‘The evolution of International Society’, in John Baylis & Steve Smith eds. The Globalisation of World Politics: An introduction to international relations, Second Edition, Oxford, 2001, pp35-50.
James, Lawrence, Raj, The Making of British India, London, 1998.
Jervis, Robert, Perception and Misperception in International Politics, Princeton, 1996.
Kennedy, Paul, ‘German World Policy and the Alliance Negotiations with England, 1897-1900’, The Journal of Modern History, Vol. 45, No. 4, (Dec., 1973), pp.605-625.
Kennedy, Paul, ‘The Kaiser and German Weltpolitik: reflections of Wilhelm II’s place in the making of German Foreign Policy’, John C.G. Röhl & Nicolaus Sombart eds., Kaiser Wilhelm II New Interpretations, Cambridge, 1982, pp.143-168.
Kennedy, Paul, ‘The First World War and the International Power System’, International Security, Vol. 9, No. 1, (Summer, 1984), pp.7-40.
Kennedy, Paul, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic change and military conflict from 1500 to 2000, London, 1989.
Kennedy, Paul, The Realities Behind Diplomacy, Background Influences on British External Policy 1865-1980, London, 1995.
Krasner, Stephen D., ‘Are Bureaucracies Important?’, Foreign Policy, No. 7, (Summer, 1972), pp.159-179.
Langer, William A., ‘Russia, the Straits Question, and the European Powers, 1904-8’, The English Historical Review, Vol. 44, No. 273, (Jan., 1929), pp.59-85.
McGeoch, Lyle A, ‘On the Road to War: British Foreign Policy in Transition, 1905-1906’, The Review of Politics, Vol. 35, No. 2, (Apr., 1973), pp.204-218.
Monger, George, The End of Isolation, British Foreign Policy 1900-1907, London, 1963.
Mosse, Werner E., ‘Russian Bureaucracy at the End of the Ancien Regime: The Imperial State Council, 1897-1915’, Slavic Review, Vol. 39, No. 4. (Dec., 1980), pp. 616-632.
Nicolson, Harold, ‘The Origins and Development of the Anglo-French Entente’, International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), Vol. 30, No. 4, (Oct., 1954), pp.407-416.
Neilson, Keith, Britain and the Last Tsar: British Policy and Russia 1894-1917, Oxford, 1995.
Packard, Laurence B., ‘Russia and the Dual Alliance’, The American Historical Review, Vol. 25, No. 3, (Apr., 1920), pp.391-410.
Papayoanou, Paul A., ‘Interdependance, Institutions, and the Balance of power: Britain, Germany, and World War I’, International Security, Vol. 20, No. 4, (Spring, 1996), pp.42-76.
Ripley, Brian, ‘Cognition, Culture and Bureaucratic Politics’, in Laura Neack, Jeanne A.K. Hey and Patrick J. Haney, eds., Foreign Policy Analysis, Continuity and Change in Its Second Generation, Englewood Cliffs, 1995, pp.85-91.
Rogger, Hans, Russia in the Age of Modernisation and Revolution 1881-1917, London, 1983.
Schroeder, Paul W., ‘Did the Vienna Settlement Rest on a Balance of Power?’, The American Historical Review, Vol.97, No.3, (Jun., 1992), pp.683-706.
Sheehan, Michael, The Balance of Power: History and Theory, Routledge, London, 1996.
Seton-Watson, Hugh, The Russian Empire 1801-1917, Oxford, 1989.
Siegel, Jennifer, Endgame, Britain, Russia and the Final Struggle for Central Asia, London, 2002.
Snyder, Jack, Myths of Empire, Domestic Politics and International Ambition, Ithaca, 1991.
Steiner, Zara, ‘Grey, Hardinge and the Foreign Office, 1906-1910’, The Historical Journal, Vol. 10, No. 3, (1967), pp.415-439.
Taylor, A.J.P., The Struggle for Mastery in Europe, 1848-1918, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1971.
Waltz, Kenneth, Theory of International politics, New York, 1979.
Wohlforth, William C., ‘The Perception of Power: Russia in the Pre-1914 Balance’, World Politics, Vol. 39, No. 3, (Apr., 1987), pp.353-381.
Yergin, Daniel, The Prize, The Epic Quest for Oil, Money, and Power, New York, 1993.
‘National Material Capabilities’ (v3.02), Correlates of War project, accessed 26/11/06 (website said to reference article) –David, Singer J., ‘Reconstructing the Correlates of War Dataset on Material Capabilities of States, 1816-1985’, International Interactions, Vol 14, (1987), pp.115-132.
What do you think?