War Powers for UK parliament

The Prime Minister is not appointed by the monarch – that is a polite fiction symbolising the continuity of the British constitution. In reality the Prime Minister is appointed as Head of Government because he or she is the leader of the largest party in the House of Commons. This means that their authority to make critical decisions, such as whether to go to war, already carries democratic legitimacy. And in practice, no Prime Minister would declare war against the will of a majority of MPs, as a parliamentary revolt could lead to a no confidence motion being passed, the Prime Minister losing office and their war policy being reversed.

The executive (the Prime Minister and their government) is always in business, able to make decisions at short notice when crises erupt. The legislature (parliament) sits for only about half the days each year, with an extended summer recess stretching well into the autumn. As military deployments often have be made at short notice (e.g. Sierra Leone, Gulf War), it makes no sense to take this power away from the Prime Minister and give it to parliament. Britain’s ability to respond quickly to a crisis would be greatly damaged if nothing could be done until MPs had been recalled and assembled to debate it. Our Government is given a democratic mandate to make decisions on our behalf; we should trust them to do so.

The open process of parliamentary debate could be very damaging to military effectiveness. The success of operations often depends on the element of surprise, which would be entirely removed if the decision to declare war was taken away from the Prime Minister and given to over 600 MPs through televised debates. And if MPs are to debate the issues involved properly, then the secret intelligence available to the government will have to be made known to them. This could aid any enemy and greatly compromise British military planning by revealing the extent of our knowledge, and also risks exposing our intelligence services by allowing their methods and agents to be identified.

Military morale could be damaged if parliament was given the power to declare war. The armed forces might resent military decisions being made by several hundred “amateurs” with little awareness of what combat involves. And the process of debate and division (voting) would reveal deep splits in political and popular opinion – how will troops feel if they know that not much more than 50% of the nation’s MPs back their mission? At least now the Prime Minister feels personal responsibility of any decision and can call upon expert advice from defence, intelligence and military sources. Because the Prime Minister has a clear electoral mandate to make life-and-death decisions, troops in the field know that the will of the nation is behind them.

If parliament is given war-making powers, it is unlikely to stick simply to issues of principle. By attaching amendments and conditions to a vote to commit troops, MPs may seek to micromanage the campaign and second guess commanders in the field. For example, when voting for a peace-keeping mission they may attach mandates which prevent British troops responding if the situation on the ground deteriorates suddenly – as has happened with other countries’ deployments in Iraq and Afghanistan. Worse even than this, if war is declared by legislation then it can be picked apart in the courts as the precise meaning of individual clauses is contested on technical or human rights grounds. The interference of political and legal amateurs in the way a war is fought will make success less likely and will further damage morale.

Britain’s multilateral commitments may be undermined by this proposal. When the UK joins an alliance or a coalition of states today, its partners know that its government is able to deliver militarily on its diplomatic commitments. This brings the UK great respect worldwide, as well as greater influence with its foreign partners when great decisions are to be made. Potential enemies are more effectively deterred because they know that our threats are not empty. All this will change if war powers are taken from the executive and given to parliament – everyone will always wonder if the Prime Minister will really be able to carry their commitments through in parliament. The problems of relying on other European countries for effective troop deployment in Afghanistan points to the dangers of giving elected representatives too much say in operational matters.

In theory giving war powers to parliament sounds a nice idea, but in the real world it would be disastrous. It is impossible to arrive at neat legal definitions of different sorts of military action. In fact, the last time Britain actually declared war was in 1942 (on Siam, now Thailand, for allying with Japan) – but British troops have fought major operations on numerous occasions in the last sixty years, including four times under Tony Blair. On the ground a reconstruction mission can quickly turn to peace-making (e.g. Sierra Leone); a peace-keeping exercise can rapidly become active warfare (e.g. Bosnia, perhaps Darfur). Should the commander on the ground wait for fresh orders as the situation deteriorates?